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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS P. SPRUNT,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD CO~IPANY, a corporation,
Defendant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Comes now the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for
rehearing in this cause for the following reasons and
upon the following grounds:

I.
The Court erred in holding that the facts as found
by it did not constitute the defense of assumption of
risk as a matter of law.
II.
The Court erred in holding that the evidence found
by the Court did present a jury question on the problmu
of contributory negligence.
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIO~
FOR REHEARING
The problem herein presented is a simple problem
in point of fact. As the Court has already indicated,
it may be posed as follows :
"M:ay the identical facts which fonnerlY constituted the defense in law of assumption ~f risk
be used in lieu of such defense as a basis for a
partial defense of contributory negligence?"
This problem in times past and prior to the 1939
amendment, 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 54, \vas in fact a very important one. The Court found it easy to define academically what constituted contributory negligence and
what constituted assumption of risk. The problem arose
when these academic principles were applied to a specific
set of facts. The Court in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co., 318 U. S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, found that
the Federal Code Annotated and the United States
Code Annotated devoted over thiry (30) pages, each in
fine print, merely to the citation and a brief sununary of
the reported decision on this proble1n and that in addition that the number of unreported and settled cases
in which the defense was involved ran into the thousands.
The Court further found that the difficulty actually
was that of disinguishing between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The Court stated after
reviewing these facts :
"In the disposition of ca8e~, the question of
plaintiff's assumption of ri~k ha~ frequently been
treated si1nply as another way of appraising defendant's 1wgl igt'lH'l' as was done by the Court
2
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in the instant case. The purpose of the 1939
mnendment was to eliminate this confusion to
si1nply the administration of the act by complete
elimination of the defense of assumption of risk
in all its phases."
Immediately after the passing of the Act, the carrier
shifted to a new approach, namely, that of non-negligence. The gist of this defense was that the railroad
was not negligent-a type of "last clear chance" doctrine,
if a man knowingly entered into property that he knew
was defective. This defense was found to lack validity
as was indicated by a number of decisions cited in
plaintiff's main brief.
Now, we see a new approach, nainely, that while
the defense of non-negligence is no longer available and
will not be considered as a defense because of the facts
upon which non-negligence was predicated actually constituted the defense of assumption of risk, that the facts
which formerly constituted assumption of risk now constitute contributory negligence. The question involved
herein is whether or not such a contention and such a
proposed defense is available to the carrier.
It is submitted that if this be true then the Courts
and the parties before the Courts are put back on the
same old "1nerry-go-round" that the 1939 amendment
attempted to prevent. Indeed, the injured worker is in
worse shape because the doctrine of contributory negligence is hereby expanded to include assumption of riska defense that was theoretically outlawed. Its effectiveness is vividly pointed out in the instant case when plaintiff's recovery was so viciously cut. We submit that in
so holding that the Court ruled contrary to the de3
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cisions in the Federal Courts and that in so doing we
respectfully submit the Court erred.
In examining this problem, we must recognize that
Federal law governs as did Judge Crockett in the case
of Maxfield v. D. & R. G., Utah, decided October 23, 1958,
330 P. 2d 1018, when he stated at page 1019:
"However, the instant case is not eontrolled
by those decisions, nor does the instant ca~e ::ffect
the law of our state. It was brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 e.S.C.A.,
51 et seq., and federal law is applicable, as recognized in Kirchgestner v. Denver R.G.\V.R. Co."
For convenience, our views will be presented under
the two points of argument heretofore stated.
ARGU1IENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDIXG THAT THE
EVIDENCE. FOUND BY IT DID NOT COXSTITUTE
THE DEFENSE OF ASSUJ\IPTIOX OF RISK: AS A
1IATTER OF LA \Y.
The case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Dine Railroad
Company, 87 L. Ed. 610, 318 C'. 8. 34, is, of course, the
leading decision on this particular problen1. In Yiew
of the fact that it was fully discussed in the petitioner's
original brief, there is no partieular point in rehashing
it. However, it is believed that there are two Pxcerpts
that are of vital i1nportanee in this matter.
In Jus tire Black's principal decision, he says:

"

~

* \Yt> hold that t>Yery vestige of the
4
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doctrine of a8stunption of risk was obliterated
from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that
Congress, by abolishing the defense of assumption
of risk in that statute did not mean to leave open
the identical defense for the master by changing
its name to "non-negligence.' As this Court said
in facing the hazy 1nargin between negligence and
assumption of risk as involved in the Safety
Appliance Act of (:March 2,) 1893, 45 USCA § l,
"Unless great care be taken, the servant's rights
will be sacrificed by simply charging him with
assumption of risk under another name;" and
no such result can be permitted here."
It will be noted that the language specifically faces
the problem of the "hazy margin between negligence and
assumption of risk," and cites the former case of
Schlmemmer v. Buffalo R & T Railroad Co., 205 U. S.
1, 51 L. Ed. 681, with approval.
The concurring opinion of :Mr. Justice Frankfurter
therefore, is of great interest because he concurred in
the decision of Justice Black and amplified that particular state1nent when he wrote:
"But an e1nployee cannot be charged with
contributory negligence simply because he assumes the risk."
In the facts at issue here, the Supre1ne Court has
found that the plaintiff was injured when in attempting
to board one of the moving cars in his customary manner
he got a hold with his left hand but missed with his
right because he had stepped into a hole, slipped, causing him to lose his balance and fall. The Court further
found that the plaintiff had known that the terrain
adjacent to the track was rough and pit marked with
5
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holes but that the hole wa~ obscured on the day in
question by snow.
The Court did not find but it is implicit in the facts
that the plaintiff did not know of the existence or the
presence of the hole in which he slipped until after he
fell because he could not see it by virtue of the snow.
Consequently, the fact of knowledge on the part of the
plaintiff is not pre~ent in this case. The only question,
therefore, is the question as to whether constructive
knowledge of the existence of this exact hole was provided for him by virtue of his six Inonths knowledge
previously that the terrain was rough and pit 1narked
with holes.
The Federal Courts and decisions on this problem
have long recognized that there is a distinction between
the defense of assumption of risk and of contributory
negligence. See Knowles v. Southern Railu·ay, Virginia,
12 S. E. 2d 821, McClain v. Charleston & lr. C. Railway
Co., South Carolina, ..J. S. E. 2d 280.
The case of Thomas v. [Tniun Railzcay Company,
6th Circuit, 216 F. 2d 18, has by all odds the closest
facts to the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff sustained injuries while carrying out his duties as an employee of the railroad. \Yhile walking along the concrete
floor of the roundhouse, he slipped and fell because his
foot caine in contact with pin grea~e that had been left
on the concrete through the negligence of the railroad.
There can be no question a~ to what the l'ourt found
as a fact, that the plaintiff knew or should haYe known
of thP Pxi::-;tenee of the grease on the floor; that such
nPgled on tlw part of thP railroad wa~ well known to

6
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the plaintiff and others. The 'rrial Court found for the
defendant and the plaintiff appealed. It would seein,
therefore, that when the Court reversed the District
Court and sent the case back for new trial that if these
facts were susceptible of the proof of negligence, the
Court would have said so. On the rationale of the
decision in the instant case and paraphrasing the language of Justice vVade in the instant decision, the Court
could very well have said that:

"It would appear not to be unreasonable
to conclude that a reasonably prudent person
with knowledge of the fact that grease was on
the floor would take precautions to ascertain
whether he ·was standing in or near sufficiently
firm ground to avoid falling."
It will be observed, ho\vever, that nowhere does the
Court make such a stateinent and, yet, in view of the
fact that this case would have to be retried, it would
appear self-evident that if this were in fact negligence
the Court should and would have so advised and guided
the Trial Court in its future conduct.
The specific problem of contributory negligence was
raised in Johnson 1:. Erie Railroad ComJWIJ:IJ, New York,
1st Circuit, 236 F. 2d 352. The plaintiff was injured
while working in a rail wa~· mail <'ar between two other
cars standing on a spur trac·k. 'l 1 he impact cam:~ed hy
the engine coupling onto the can.; without warning caused
plaintiff to lose his balance and fall. The Court specifically instructed upon contributory negligence and in
that regard raised the question as to what, if anything,
he did contribute to his injury. Part of the difficulty
in this ca:->e was attributed to the fact that he had had

7
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a previous injury and he knew that any knock or jar
would aggravate his condition. However, the Court
of Appeals held that the effect of its posing of the
question of contributory negligence forced the jury to
consider assumption of risk and in so doing a new trial
was required.
The only case that would appear to give the defendant any comfort is that of Murray v. New York, Ne~
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 2d Circuit, 255
F. 2d 42. In that case, the Court discusses the difference
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
and concluded that in the particular case involved, contributory negligence lay. However, an examination of
the decision indicates that the basis for the opinion
that contributory negligence lay, arose from the fact that
the plaintiff was accused of a violation of a company
rule.
Violation of a rule is a fact that has always been
outside the doctrine of assumption of risk. See Owens
v. U. P., Washington, 63 Supreme Court 1271, 319 U. S.
715, 87 L. Ed. 1683. Again, the violation of a rule does
not constitute assun1ption of risk but is at most contributory negligence leading to division of damages.
Cross v. Spokane and P & S Railway Co., 291 P. 336,
157 Waslzingtuu 428. Certiorari denied, 51 Supreme
Court 345, 283 U. S. 821, 73 L. Ed. 1436.
It will be seen that the :Murray case had in addition
to the facts that established assun1ption of risk an additional fact that had never been classified as at'suinption
of risk but on the contrary had always been classified
as nPgligenre or contributory negligence. \Vhere, it
8
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might be asked, is the additional fact that takes the
case at bar out of assumption of risk and into the realm
of contributory negligence'?

It is believed that the Suprmue Court of the United
States has already answered this question. In Pryor
1.:. Al ega lV illiam..,, 1920, 65 L. Ed. 120, the Court had
before it an action under the F. E. L. A. where negligence
\\·a~ charged against the defendant as receiver of the
Wabash Railroad C01upany. The plaintiff was engaged
in tearing down a bridge. rrhere was a defect in the
claw bar which he was directed to use and said defect
caused the bar to slip. He lost his balance and fell to
the ground some twelve ( 12) feet below. The Trial
Court found that the defect in the claw bar was so
obvious that the rnost cursory and superficial inspection would have disclosed it to the plaintiff. The defendant charged assumption of risk and contributory negligence. A jury verdict was entered in favor of the
plaintiff for $5,000.00; however, the 'l_lrial Court reversed the judgment and denied a :Motion for Rehearing.
The Supreme Court of 1\Iissouri, on appeal, held that
the facts involved did not constitute assumption of
risk but did, if anything, amount to contributory negligence and that sueh negligence under the 11-,ederal
statutes worked a reduction in damages and not a defeat
of the action. 'rhe Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, finding that the facts constituted assumption
of risk and not contributory negligence.
The effect of this decision is that when an employe('
is injured hy reason of defects in a claw har which he
is using and which an ordinary prudent eu1ployee would
9
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not have used because of those defects that the employee is guilty of assumption of risk as a 1natter of
law and not of contributory negligence.
If it is assumption of risk and not contributory
negligence for a person to use a defective bar where
the defects were so obvious that a cursory examination
would have indicated them, can it be otherwise here for
a man to fail to observe a defect in the ground covered by
snow which would have been found according to the
Supreme Court decision in the event he had made the
examination as an ordinary prudent person would have
made. However, if there is any last lingering doubt as
to whether this constitutes assumption of risk, it is
believed that they are dispelled by two cases. One from
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Jacobson v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railroad, 22 N. W. 2d 455, where the Court
held at page 459 :
"In detern1ining whether plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence and whether, as defendant claims, his contributory n~gligence was
the sole proximate cause of the accident, it is
our plain duty to lay out of 1nind any question
of whether he was guilty of assun1ption of risk,
because that defense was entirely obliterated by
the 1939 mnendment of the act. Crawford v. D.
M. & I. R. Ry. Co., 220 ~linn. 225, 19 N. \Y. 2d 384.
The defense of assun1ption of risk is not to be
let in under the label of contributory negligence.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S.
54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967,
supra. See, :Maloney v. Cunard Stemnship Co.,
Ltd., 217 N. Y. 278, 111 N. E. 835."
Finally, in the case of Southcr11 Pacific Com,pany r.
10
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Allen, Texas, 106 S. W. 2d 441, the Court had before it
the identical argument to that at bar, namely, that the
facts which constituted assumption of risk may also
constitute contributory negligence and even though the
one is barred the other may be presented to the jury
notwithstanding that both the instructions of assumption or risk and contributory negligence are based on the
identical facts. The Court disposed of this matter at
page 446 as follows :
"If, in cases where the same facts which
would make out the defense of assu1ned risk
(were such defense not abolished) would also
constitute the defense of contributory negligence,
the latter defense should be allowed to prevail,
the humane and beneficient purpose of Congress
would in a large number of cases be rendered
abortive. Therefore, as a statute should be so
construed as to accmnplish its evident intention
and purpose, we are of the opinion that the act,
in abolishing the defense of assumed risk, did
away with any other defense, though of a different name, which would be constituted by identically the smne facts which go to establish that of
assumed risk."
No case was cited hy the Court in support of its
position that the two different defenses may arise and
be predicated upon the identical statement of fact. The
defendant did in its brief, as page 20, cite the case of
L & l\[ Railroad Con1pany v. l\lorrill, Alabama, 99 S.
297, in support of this position. However, an examination of the case clearl~' indicates that the case does not
support the position assigned it by the defendant. In
that case the Court said that if it found one set of facts
that the jury would be warranted in finding assumption
11
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of risk, that, if on the other hand, they found a second
set of facts that it would be justified at finding contributory negligence. Nowhere did the Supreme Court
of Alabama say that the jury would be warranted in
finding both from the identical statement of facts.

ARGUMENT
II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE FOUND BY THE COURT DID PRESENT A JURY QUE:STION ON THAT PROBLE~I
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff was on these unfit and dangerous
premises because he was required to do so by reason
of his employment. He did not have a choice in selection
and while he went voluntarily, it must be recognized
that he went voluntarily because he desired to continue
his employment.
The mere fact that a servant is aware that he is
exposing himself to danger does not make his guilty
of contributory negligence. Toone l'. J. 0. O'K eill Construction Company, Utah, 121 P. 10; "A'eit.zke v. KraftPhenix Dairies, Inc., 214 lVisconsin 4-!1, 253 N. TV. 579;
Kaumans r. lVhite Star Gas & Oil Company, 63 P. 'Jd
231; Schirra l.'. D. L. & Tr. Ry. Co., 103 Fed. Supp. 812.
Plaintiff desires to eite but one case in support of
its position to the effect that the facts herein do not
constitute contributory negligence of any kind on the

12
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part of the plaintiff. That case is the case of Schrader
v. Kriesel, Jiinn., 1950, 45 N. W. 2d 395. This appeal
arose out of a tort action wherein the plaintiffs, husband
and wife, were suing the defendant, a used car dealer,
for injury sustained by the wife while walking upon the
premises of the defendant. The plaintiff wife had been
on the premises of the defendant before. She had observed the surface of the lot previous to the date of
injury and knew in advance that the surface was rough
although she did not see the rut which caused the fall
on the day in question because the ruts were covered with
snow. She further stated that on her previous visits she
had made similar observations although upon her previous visits conditions were not as bad as they were on
the night of the accident. Only one of the three questions
raised on appeal is relevant to this problem, and that
question was :
"Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent?"
The Suprerne Court held that it was a jury question
but that the jury question was whether or not the
plaintiff had assurned the risk of injury upon entering
the property of the used car dealer and not whether she
was guilty of contributory negligence or not.

It is difficult to see how a case could be rnuch
closer on the facts than the instant case with the
Schrader case. In both cases, the party knew or had
reason to know or believe that the surface was rough.
In both cases, the ground was covered with ~now so that
the ruts, holes or unevenness was obscured from their
13
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v1ew. In the one case, it is held to be assumption of
risk and not contributory negligence. It is subn1itted
that there is no factual or legal basis for the predication
of the conclusion that a negligence question arose in
this case to be submitted to the jury, and, we respectfully
suggest that the Court erred in so holding.
Respectfully submitted,

C. C. PATTERSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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